This story was originally published by the WND News Center.

'The choices before Khamenei are no longer between good and bad – or even bad and worse. They are between disaster and catastrophe'

The second round of negotiations between Iran and Western powers is unfolding amid escalating internal tensions within the Islamic Republic. At the heart of this internal strife is a clan known as the "hard core of the regime," which is no longer merely at odds with rival political factions, but seems at times openly defying Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself. This comes after Khamenei expressed tacit support for the talks and the Iranian negotiating team in a recent speech.

This "hard core" comprises elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, plainclothes security forces and key branches of the intelligence apparatus. Though numerically in the minority, they represent the foundation of the Islamic Republic's power structure. These forces are responsible for widespread repression in the streets and for orchestrating acts of violence and executions within the country's prison system.

From its inception, the Iranian regime has based its identity on rigid religious dogma with roots in medieval theology. It has projected this identity outward through slogans like "Death to America" and "Death to Israel," while simultaneously enforcing brutal repression at home. The IRGC was created to serve this dual mission: exporting terrorism abroad and quelling dissent domestically.

Leveraging this ideological hostility, the regime succeeded in consolidating a loyal base of repressive forces internally, while building a network of proxy militias across the region. Yet now, the very regime that once dubbed the United States "the Great Satan" and "enemy of the revolution" finds itself seated across from its former nemesis – negotiating and shaking hands.

Two diverging paths before the regime

Today, the Iranian regime faces a stark binary choice:

Engage in negotiations with the United States and Western allies, which would require abandoning its nuclear program, halting support for proxy forces and stepping back from military interference in the region.

Or, refuse to yield, risking airstrikes on nuclear sites, the full reimposition of maximum sanctions and a scenario comparable to the dismantling of Hezbollah's military infrastructure.

Reports from political circles in Tehran suggest that senior IRGC commanders, along with high-ranking officials – including newly elected president Masoud Pezeshkian – have warned Khamenei that the second path, which entails escalating international pressure and military confrontation, could lead to the inevitable collapse of the Islamic Republic.

It is worth recalling that on March 2, at the onset of Ramadan, Khamenei addressed a gathering of current and former IRGC and government officials, declaring that negotiations with the United States were "neither wise" "nor honorable," and "not rational."

The ideological origins of the regime's hard core

According to an investigative report by the semi-official Etemaad website, the "hard core" of the regime – also called the "ideological-security circle" – consists of factions that define their legitimacy through unwavering allegiance to the revolution's founding ideology: implementing sharia law, rejecting Western engagement and sustaining permanent hostility toward the United States.

This faction emerged in the 1990s and has since remained ideologically rigid. For its members, any compromise – whether on hijab enforcement, foreign policy or diplomatic relations with the West – is viewed as a direct existential threat to the regime.

Historically, their relationship with Khamenei has been one of mutual reinforcement. He saw them as the regime's shield against internal dissent – "the force that paralyzes opposition from within" – and in return, they defined their mission as the "unconditional defense of the Supreme Leader."

Reformists vs. the hard core?

If negotiations proceed, it is expected that so-called moderate and reformist factions will gain momentum, while the hard core will lose influence. "Reformists" oppose measures such as strict hijab enforcement in public that could ignite new waves of civil unrest. They view such policies as accelerants to regime collapse. Still, despite their reformist rhetoric, these groups have largely remained silent amid the rising tide of executions, failing to issue clear condemnations or take meaningful action.

The crumbling pillar of power

Should the regime proceed with an agreement that includes halting its nuclear and missile programs, it will likely weaken the foundational power base that has supported it for decades.

This would empower the so-called reformists or moderates, who believe that negotiating with the United States is not just permissible but essential for the regime's survival. However, these factions appear blind to a critical truth: Any serious engagement with the West will, inevitably, lead to demands for political openness and reform.

And this would come at a perilous moment. In the most recent presidential election, only about 8% of eligible voters participated, many under pressure and amid an atmosphere of intimidation. Such a lack of public legitimacy could become the final accelerant in the regime's collapse.

Can Khamenei really be unaware?