The Supreme Court ruled against two veterans who were denied disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder.
In a 7-2 decision, the court held that the petitioners' claims went through the legally required review process. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) applies a special "benefit of the doubt" rule, which tips the scales in favor of veterans when evidence for and against them is in "approximate balance."
The Supreme Court considered what degree of deference veterans should receive under the rule. The majority took a narrow view, arguing "benefit of the doubt" only requires a veteran's court to look for "clear error" in the VA's determination.
“We hold that the VA’s determination that the evidence is in approximate balance is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error,” Justice Clarence Thomas wrote.
Both veterans had their claims denied by the VA, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, and the U. S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court).
Petitioner Joshua Bifkin served in the Air Force from late 2005 to early 2006. He requested and obtained a nonprejudicial hardship discharge after his wife threatened to commit suicide if he stayed in the military. Years later, he applied for disability benefits, citing PTSD, but his claim was denied.
The second veteran, Norman Thornton, served in the Army from 1988 to 1991. He received benefits for PTSD, but the VA denied his request to raise his disability rating beyond 50%.
The two veterans said they are entitled, under the "benefit of the doubt" rule, to a thorough review of the facts. They pointed to Congress' instruction for the Veterans Court to "take due account" of the VA's application of the benefit of the doubt rule.
Clarence Thomas, writing for the Supreme Court, said Congress never intended to create a new standard of review with its "take due account" language. Since the balancing of evidence in disability cases is primarily a factual issue, the Veterans Court should apply the "clear error" standard normally used when reviewing factual findings by lower courts, Thomas wrote.
"However labeled, the directive to 'take due account' does not do the work that petitioners envision. Had Congress intended to impose a new standard of review for challenges to the VA’s application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule, it would have clearly named a standard," he wrote.
Dissenting, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson and Justice Neil Gorsuch argued that that the "clear error" standard is not appropriate.
Whether the VA correctly followed the "benefit of the doubt" rule is a legal - not a factual - question subject to a higher standard of review, they said.
The majority's reading of the "take due account" language trivializes Congress' intentions and treats the Veterans Court like a "rubber stamp," Jackson wrote.
“In short, the court today concludes that Congress meant nothing when it inserted [take due account] in response to concerns that the Veterans court was improperly rubber-stamping the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt determinations, and also that the Veterans court is not obliged to do anything more than defer to those agency decisions notwithstanding Congress’s ‘take due account’ direction,” Jackson said.
