This story was originally published by the WND News Center.
JERUSALEM – On day 373 of the war between Israel and Hamas – although more correctly between Israel and Iran – evidence has emerged the Oct. 7, 2023 attack which started it, was designed to be significantly more deadly, part of an extraordinary plan which would have seen both Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists shaking hands in Tel Aviv.
International media outlets obtained a series of documents – released Saturday – which make for sobering reading. One of the first points of note is Hamas had wanted to undertake its operation – self-labeled "the Big Project" among a secret cabal of its leadership – already in 2022.
The Washington Post said it had obtained letters from Yahoo Sinwar of Hamas to Iranian officials, which discussed financing such an operation as early as 2021. Indeed, the Gaza terrorist's group seeking to co-opt both Hezbollah and Iran more directly to its cause, turned out to be the source of the delay.
The report, which first appeared in the New York Times, was based on IDF-recovered recordings in January, of meetings with Hamas' now undisputed leader Yahya Sinwar, at which his brother, Muhammad, as well as now-eliminated leaders Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa, were present at several.
According to the report, the deputy head of Hamas' political bureau, Khalil al-Hayya, informed senior Iranian commander Mohammed Said Izadi of the plot in July 2023, in Lebanon. According to Izadi, Hezbollah and Iran both sanctioned the operation "in principle" – although they cautioned more time was needed to "prepare the environment." Now-eliminated Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was supposed to meet with Hamas representatives in person, although it was postponed.
Hamas leaders seemed to be mollified it would not be left "exposed," although it reportedly left open the possibility it would go it alone, whether it had the explicit material support of either Hezbollah and Iran – which are effectively two sides of the same coin.
The details of the proposed attack are well-delineated in the report, and there was a clear intention to make it as spectacular as possible. At its heart was using subterfuge to allow Israel to be drawn deeper into its own conception, i.e. the impression Hamas was a rational actor, which wanted to improve the people of Gaza's economic standing, and could be placated by doing so.
Hamas leadership was relieved when an uptick in tension – presumably such as the often violent demonstrations against the border fence – never fully boiled over. In this way, it was able to maintain the ruse it sought to tamp down conflagrations and was instead in search of calm. Meanwhile, Sinwar and his cronies were plotting an attack, alongside a broader regional war, which he hoped would bring about Israel's collapse.
However, Hamas was dissuaded from this course of action after it concluded it lacked the ability – whether as a technical problem of the right amount of explosives or given the mall's proximity to IDF headquarters of time sensitivity and a lack of detection – to bring the towers down.
The mechanics for the attack – which presumably looked on paper a lot like what transpired on Oct. 7 – were in place around the Rosh Hashanah – the Jewish New Year – in mid-September 2022. Hamas appeared ready to attack military bases and then pivot to civilian residences. However, it would be almost 13 months later when the attack was so infamously carried out.
There was seemingly no specific reason for the delay, other than the one outlined above about Hezbollah and Iran wanting more time to prepare the ground. However, there were at least four significant catalysts for Hamas choosing to strike when it did:
- The concern about reports of significant advancements in Israel's military defense technology particularly with regard to lasers capable of shooting down rockets and missiles at a fraction of the cost of the Iron Dome and David's Sling etc.
- A perception about the nature of Israel's most ring-wing government ever, specifically coupled with the notion that the status quo on the Temple Mount might be in jeopardy – hence calling the eventual operation on Oct. 7, "the al-Aqsa Flood."
- A sensitivity to the divisions within Israeli society, practically ripped apart as it was over the judicial reform bill. Hamas leaders thought soldiers refusing to appear for reserve duty or air force pilots from topping up their training would be a perfect time to strike.
- There was a strong desire to scupper the possibility of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would have been perhaps the crowning achievement of the Abraham Accords.
Only a very select few of the Hamas leadership was aware of the plans, and apart from the now-eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, there was a clear delineation between Gaza and the so-called "hotel guys" in Qatar. With secrecy at a premium, even lower-level operatives – the ones who would actually lead and take part in the attack – were only informed mere hours before it took place.
On the Jewish festival of Simchat Torah – Oct. 7, 2023 – Sinwar unleashed his hordes, the result of which has changed the face of the Middle East forever.
