This story was originally published by the WND News Center.
JERUSALEM – The Israel Defense Forces' new report includes its findings from a military probe into some of the failings on Oct. 7, presenting them initially to residents of Kibbutz Be’eri, one of the worst-hit communities on that "Black Sabbath."
The specially convened presentation took place at a Dead Sea hotel, where internally displaced refugees have been staying since their homes were largely destroyed by Hamas terrorists. While providing some answers, the probe left significant questions hanging, and the report neither assuaged some of the community's pent-up fury amid its ongoing trauma, nor did it restore trust in the army. There are those who wonder aloud whether that sacred bond between the IDF – a largely conscript army – and the people, particularly those who felt bereft and abandoned on Oct. 7, will ever be fully repaired. It was more than just 1,200 people Hamas terrorists annihilated that day; they also damaged – perhaps irreparably – the "stickiness" that helps hold Israeli society together.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Mickey Edelstein, a former commander of the Gaza division, headed up the information gathering. The probe's findings did answer some important questions, and its thoroughness helped kibbutz members understand "the depth and complexity of the events that occurred" during the seemingly never-ending hours of Hamas' brutal onslaught.
The first wave of attackers arrived at around 6:45 on the morning of Oct 7, and at its peak, more than 300 terrorists drawn from Hamas' elite Nukhba force, additional Hamas operatives, 100-150 Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters, as well as other terrorist organizations joined the fray. At 11:30 a.m. that day, Palestinian civilians who had swarmed across the border came to the kibbutz to loot, riot and pillage.
Two additional companies of Hamas' Nuseirat Battalion arrived shortly after midday, following their massacre of young party-goers at the Nova Music Festival. Ultimately, the all-clear was not given until the morning of Monday, Oct. 9, when the final terrorists who had been roaming around both the kibbutz and the countryside were eliminated.
The investigators spent hundreds of hours sifting through residents' WhatsApp messages, reviewing both Israeli and Hamas radio communications, checking surveillance footage and aerial reconnaissance, as well as interviewing survivors and those who fought in the battle to save the kibbutz and its residents. Supplemental intelligence was also gathered from interrogating captured Hamas terrorists.
However, several critical questions – and ones that may not get resolved without a full commission of inquiry – were left unanswered.
These include why military forces did not enter the kibbutz for several hours – despite the desperate pleas of those trapped behind its yellow sliding electric gate. This issue seemed to be partly explained by the fact that although defenders did arrive in numbers, nobody took overall command of the kibbutz's defense. And certainly nobody decided to go in at once and attempt to take out the Hamas fighters. This was not expressly said, but the general chaos of hundreds of terrorists swarming around – with dead bodies liberally scattered across roads and fields – added to the confusion. More than 100 civilians and 31 security personnel were slain at the kibbutz, which had a pre-invasion population of about 1,000, while 30 other residents and two additional civilians were kidnapped to Gaza. Eleven of them remain in captivity. At one point, the attackers outnumbered the defenders by 340 to 26.
The probe also dealt with the vexing issue of the hostage incident at Pessi Cohen's house, where the IDF was alleged to have shelled the dwelling in which an at-the-time unknown number of attackers held some 13 or 14 hostages. The inquiry revealed that "under complex and difficult circumstances," in which negotiation efforts were fully exhausted, an order was given to fire a tank shell at "the area near the house" – an attempt to put pressure on the terrorists holed up inside. None of the civilians in the building was harmed by the tank shell, although shrapnel from the shell did wound two civilians outside the house. Gunfire was subsequently heard from the house following the shell being fired, and the terrorists communicated their desire to commit suicide, having killed their hostages.
"The team determined most of the hostages were likely murdered by the terrorists, and further inquiries and reviews of additional findings are necessary," the report stated.
Other questions the kibbutz's residents had centered around the intelligence failures – both on the day of the attack, and the 24 to 48 hours preceding it. The legitimate query of what caused the intelligence failure, especially as previous leaks have shown at least certain parts of the IDF were aware of Hamas' attack plans, also remained unanswered. The probe's concerns did not cover how the terrorists were able to either bypass, or simply dismantle with bulldozers, an extremely expensive fence with highly reactive sensors. This crucial question will also have to wait for the official commission of inquiry Kibbutz Be’eri’s residents have insisted the government set up.
"[The IDF] must provide us with answers that will allow us to begin to heal and draw practical conclusions for the future, so the unimaginable loss we experienced will never be experienced again by any other citizen, so we can rebuild our trust in the security forces, and so we can return to live in Be’eri with a sense of security," their statement said.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi accepted the probe's findings and drew the following conclusions: Principally, the IDF failed in its mission to defend the residents of the country "in the most grave manner." It clearly illustrates the "magnitude of the failure and the dimensions of the disaster that befell the residents of the south who protected their families with their bodies for many hours, and the IDF was not there to protect them." One of the kibbutz residents told Israel's Channel 12, "People were slaughtered in their homes. The top command should draw conclusions and those who failed should resign."
Halevi acknowledged individual and collective acts of heroism among the kibbutz's residents and the security forces who did try to defend it, but he cited "severe mistakes and errors," with a need to quickly learn from them and strengthen the response in the future. He also said the army was unprepared for the scale of the invasion that took place, having trained for "single intrusions" rather than a wide-scale assault on multiple points along the fence.
There are some 40 additional military probes in various stages of completion. The army hopes to have them all published by August. One of these investigations is reviewing the IDF's conduct and conception of operational procedure stretching back to the March 2018 Hamas-led border riots. Its findings are considered key.
